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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROChJ·:T l\1INI~G CO~PORA­
TIO~. a Utah corporat10n, and 
PJUNEEH CAIUSSA GOLD 
~lINES, I>.'C. a \\'yoming 
c1lrpnrat ion, 
Pf11/11tiffs o)l(f Respo11dcnts, 
\"S. 
HL;LAl\ .J. (;ILL and 
.~~GELO ~I. BILLIS, 
!Jcf( 11ilu11fs 011d A.ppcllonts. 
Case No. 
10467 
EEPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
REPLY TO PETITIONERS' PRELIMIARY 
STATE~IENT AND 
ST.\ TE~IENTS OF FACTS 
The dt>tai Jt.d statemPnt of facts contained m 
JJla111tiffs-n·sp1l1Hlents brief at page 4 is comprehen-
si1e and \\·here 1w~·(·ssary reference will be made to 
thi:; ::;tatL·111l·nt of facts rather than to restate the 
;:i:tm1· in this brit•f. The plaintiff, after both sides 
had ern11pklt'd their discm·ery, mm·ed for summary 
J11drznH·nt and the trial court granted this motion 
'1 ~ ,11 r1n1· tal\st> of action. The defendants appealed 
fr,, ·1 rh(· .l!rnnt ing of this judgment. The facts pre-
~(·11t1·rl t() th(• court \\'Pre agreed facts and there 
'
1
' fr nu issu1•:; 1d' fact h'ft to be tried as to this cause 
uf act1ll11. Tlw undisputt>d facts were as follows: 
1. The defendants we1·e the owners of 90' 
of the stock of Rocket Mining Corporation '"h. 1 ' n lC I 
stock they received in consideration for transfo_ 
ing mining claims to the corporation. These sa
111
, 
claims they later caused the corporation to abandoi1. 
2. In order to obtain approval from the Sec:un 
ties and Exchange Commission of the United Statei 
and from the Securities Department of the State 
of Utah to sell stock to the public the defendants 
executed an agreement in connection with their 
registration statement and issued a prospectus in 
which they covenanted that they would serve the 
company without salary until the company's mining 
operations "are on a paying basis". (See, pages ~ 
and 5 of Plaintiff-Respondents' Answering Brief.) 
3. The sale of the public stock was approved 
based on the promises and representations contained 
in the registration statement and offering circular 
to the effect that. the defendants would not dra',r 
salaries until the company's properties were on a 
paying basis. The defendants then caused 3,000,0011 
shares of the common stock of the corporation to bt 
sold to the public. 
4. The defendants then voted salaries to them-
selves at a meeting where no quorum of clirectci·s 
was present and accrued these salaries notwirh-
standing the fact that the corporation had no ;,,, 
come at all from any of its operations. (See, Pla111-
tiff-Respondents' Answering Brief, pages 7 aild ~11 
2 
5. The defendants then sold the company pro-
pet'ties without corporate authority and paid them-
selves the accrued salaries from the proceeds of the 
sale. (See, Plaintiff-Appellants' Answering Brief, 
pages 7 and 8.) 
The trial court correctly ruled that this was an 
nnproper payment of corporate funds to the de-
fendant directors and this court on appeal from that 
judgment affirmed the trial court's ruling. 
POINT I. 
THE RULING AND OPINION OF THE COURT IS 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECIDED CASES. THE 
O~LY CASE CITED AGAINST THE OPINION OF THIS 
COURT IS STRONG AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF 
THE COURT'S OPINION. 
The defendant appellants complained that the 
granting of the plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment and the affirmation of that ruling by the Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah violates their 
constitutional right to a trial on the issues deter-
mined by this judgment. 
The propriety of the granting of summary judg-
ments where there is no issue of fact is so well 
settled that no authorities need be cited in support 
thereof. Petitioner cites the case of Fountain v. 
Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 69 S. Ct. 745, 93 L. Ed. 971 
(rn39) as authority for the proposition that the 
opinion of this court is against the law. This case is 
authority for no such proposition and actually is 
strong authority in support of the court's opinion. 
3 
In the Fountain case the District Court for the]_)· 
II ~1·ict of Columbia granted a motion for summaiv 
Judgment in favm· of the defendant in a suit b:. 
the plaintiff to establish a i·esulting t1·ust. The soil 
basis of the motion for summary judgment was that 
the New Jersey law would not permit imposition 
of a resulting trust under the pleading in the corn. 
plaint. The complaint proceeded on a theory of re-
sulting trust and in addition, plead an altemafoe 
cause of action. The defendant's motion for surn 
mary judgment was directed solely against the n-
sulting trust cause of action. The District Court 
granted the motion for summai·y judgment in fa\w 
of the defendant. On appeal the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia did three things: (1) 
The court agreed with the ti·ial court t!:at nu re-
sulting trust could arise unde1· New J e1·s2y l~m. 
( 2) The court stated that the g1·anting of summary 
judgment was erroneous because the complaint al-
leged an alternative them·y of i·eco\rery which, if 
proved, would allow the plain tiff to preYail indt· 
pendently of the theory of a resulting trust. (:3) Tbr 
Court of Appeals examined the depositions and con 
eluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recon'r OI' 
the alternci.tive theory which we.is not even befor 
the conrt 0~1 appeal and gl'anted jucl~·rnent for tlw 
plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Comt of t!w 
United States the Supreme Coul't pointed out tlwt 
the only issue before the trial court, and hence t;'e 
only issue befm·e the Court of Appeals, \\."at:i whetlier 
01 
not the New Jersey law precluded the plaintiff 
recorering on the theory of a resulting trust. The 
~upreine Court furthe1· held that the Court of Ap-
pe:.1i:~ had no right to i·each beyond the issues raised 
lw the appeal from the trial court and grant judg-
11;ent tu tht> plaintiff on the alternative cause be-
cause the plaintiff had not sought summary judg-
ment on the alte1·native cause of action before the 
trial comt. The Sum·eme Court, therefore, remanded 
the case for fmthe1· trial on the alternative theory 
of rccm'ery and vacated the judgment granted the 
plaintiff b.v the Com·t of Appeals. In so doing, the 
Supreme Court made is perfectly clear that it was 
not disapproving of the summary judgment entered 
by the Trial Comt but stated that the defendant 
was entitled to meet the issues raised by the alterna-
ti,·e cause of action and since this had never been 
bmg-ht hefoi·e the trial comt, the appellate court 
lrncl no right to i·each beyond the issues raised by 
tllP ai;pe(l ~ ~rncl gnmt judgment to the plaintiff on 
the altrrnatin cause of action. In so doing the court 
8pnrorecl 1if Ru1e ;)6 where the issues are before the 
"OU''t and thei·e is no dispute of facts which requires 
the further taking of evidence. 
The drcision of the Fountain case is in no way 
11 1c" 11sistent with the opinion of this court and en-
ri~·('l:· suppo;·ts that opinion. The facts necessary 
:i:r the gi·antillg of a summa1·y judgment were be-
tore the t1·i::d court and the issues involving the 
Lri;:il court's ruling we1·e fully before the Supreme 
Court and the opm10n of this court tl'eats that 
matter and properly excluded from the opinion , 
great many irrelevant matters attempted to be rais~ 
ed by the defendant appellants. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT IN ITS OPINION CORRECTLY DJs. 
REGARDED A NUMBER OF THE ARGUMENTS PRE. 
SENTED BY THE APPELLANT BECAUSE THESE 
ARGUMENTS WERE TOTALLY WITHOUT MERIT 
AND THERE WAS NO OCCASION FOR THE COllRT 
TO TREAT THESE ARGUMENTS IN ITS OPINIO\ 
The defendant appellants in their petition fnr 
rehearing complain that the court ignored many of 
its legal arguments and did not treat the same in 
the opinion. No authority is cited for the prnposi-
tion that this deprives the defendant appellant of 
any basic rights and it is submitted that if each of 
these arguments was treated the opinion would br 
voluminous and the treatment would add nothing 
to the body of law since the law applicable to i;10st 
of these arguments is very clear. 
As an example of the type of argument which 
the petitioner desired the court to examine, the peti 
tioner claims that the corporation is estopped undP: 
Utah law from accepting the services of the defend 
ants and not paying for the same. This argumen1 
is most remarkable in view of the undisputed fact 
that the defendant appellants specifically agrreri 
with the corporation, its stockholders and the goi· 
erning administrative bureaus regulating the . 
of securities that they would not receive any salaric' 
6 
until the mining operations of the company were on 
a paying basis. In o~her words, .they agreed. to serve 
thr company gi·atmtously until the profits from 
the mining operations would justify a meeting of the 
board of <lirectorn to vote salaries to executive per-
sonnel. The undisputed facts are that the two de-
fendants met and voted salaries at a time when the 
company had no income and subsequently paid those 
salaries from the proceeds of the sale of the corpor-
ate assets. There cannot be an estoppel since the 
defendants agreed to serve the corporation without 
pay and the corporation, therefore, did not receive 
~my unjust enrichment. It simply received the serv-
ices which were agreed to be rendered to it without 
the corporation incuring any obligation therefor. 
The fact that the defendants agreed to serve the 
corpo:·ation \vithout compensation is not remarkable 
since they owned 90 ~,,~ of the corporate stock them-
selres. Any increase in the value of the equity 
would largely inure to their benefit. Since there was 
~bso:utely no merit to the argument of estoppel 
there was no occasion for the court to treat it in 
the opinion and to fail to comment on this argu-
ment depriYes the defendants of no substantial 
'·~;hts. The oplnion ably dis~~osed of a good many 
'.:r1/ar arguncnts haviilg no legal merit when it 
1e 0 1:n2c1 to i1wolve itself in a detailed dis::ussion of 
1hc,se arguments. 
The petitione1· for rehearing reiterates the argu-
lil('i1L it made in its brief that the sale of the corpor-
7 
ate assets did constitute a profit from the minin 
operations within the meaning of the agreernent anJ 
that, therefore, the defendant appellants were ju8ti-
fied in paying themselves from the proceeds. 1'ht 
petitioner overlooks, however, the very importan! 
fact that the salaries paid were voted and accrueu 
prior to any sale of the corporate assets and, there. 
fore, even if their interpretation of the meaning 
of the language of the registration statement an;] 
offering circular was correct the very earliest dal1" 
that the defendants could call a meeting to vote 
salaries for themselves would be after the sale of 
the corporate assets and under no construction uf 
the language of the agreement could the defendant, 
pay themselves for past services rendered at a time 
when the corporation had no revenues whatsoever 
from operations. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the opinion 01 
the court was sound and in accordance with la11 
and that the defendant appellants have not been de· 
prived of any rights which they may have to ~·1 
adjudication of the cause of action ruled upon b' 
the trial court and the Supreme Court of the Statt 
of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON I. HYDE 
555 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for , 
Plaintiffs u.nd Respo11dc11i.: 
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